The Administration’s Goal is to Create a Crisis to Justify Radical Action Come September.
July 2, 2017
Dear Colleagues,
President Dell’Omo has communicated with you a number of times about this summer’s negotiations, and, in all of his communications, he has included the claim that his goal is to reach a fair agreement in a timely manner. That goal is, of course, one that we share. But the administration's actions speak louder than their words, and those actions point to a very different conclusion. We fear that the administration’s goal is to create a crisis in order to justify radical action on their part come September.
The following has reluctantly brought us to this conclusion:
Your Negotiating Team,
Mike Brogan
Dave Dewberry
Herb Gishlick
Jeff Halpern
Joel Phillips
Elizabeth Scheiber
Arthur Taylor
July 2, 2017
Dear Colleagues,
President Dell’Omo has communicated with you a number of times about this summer’s negotiations, and, in all of his communications, he has included the claim that his goal is to reach a fair agreement in a timely manner. That goal is, of course, one that we share. But the administration's actions speak louder than their words, and those actions point to a very different conclusion. We fear that the administration’s goal is to create a crisis in order to justify radical action on their part come September.
The following has reluctantly brought us to this conclusion:
- Constantly escalating economic demands. As you know, the AAUP has been in conversation for a year about the shape of a future Agreement. On July 8, 2016, the administration made a proposal to us that involved monetary concessions over three years (FY17-FY19). We countered with a proposal that would have extended the Agreement through FY20. On November 7, in response, the administration upped the ante with a new proposal justifying their actions with the following statement:
“First, while it is true that the proposal we made on Friday contained greater concessions than our initial proposal, it was based upon the position you took that the AAUP would only consider concessions that were connected to an extension of the labor agreement. As we had stated when you initially articulated that position, and reiterated on Friday, we can only forgo the opportunity at the bargaining table to achieve meaningful and significant base budget savings for fiscal years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 if we accomplish these savings through these discussions. Given the extent of the deficits and the looming negative cash flow situation, it would be irresponsible to do otherwise”
This, of course, made little sense since their initial proposal called for savings through FY19, and their new proposal still only went through FY19. In addition, their projection of future budget deficits declined between July and November 2016 by almost $8 million.
In early January 2017, we put a proposal on the table with concessions valued by them at $2.5 million per annum. In response they insisted that we go back and put more on the table. We declined to do so until they provided a new offer. They finally did so in May. This new demand upped the ante yet again. In July 2016, the administration was demanding annual concession valued at $5.8 million, in November 2016 they demanded $6.8 million, and by May 2017 their demands had escalated to over $10 million per annum.
At the table they have now said that the $10 million reduction in our compensation is not simply a bargaining position, and that we have no choice but to accept that figure. A party that is looking for an agreement moves towards the other side not away from it. But every time we have moved towards their position they have moved further away.
- Increased non-monetary demands. We see the same pattern in the administration's non-monetary demands as we saw in its demands for monetary concessions: their July 2016 proposal had no non-monetary proposals; their November 2016 proposal included one significant change to Academic Governance; their May 2017 administration proposal included radical changes to Academic Governance, Promotion and Tenure, Faculty Ranks, Workload, Course Evaluations, etc. If the Administration truly wants a fair agreement in a timely manner, why would they increase their non- monetary demands and propose to radically alter a system that has worked very effectively for Rider for decades? Agreeing on money may be contentious, but the factors involved are fairly straightforward. Changes to governance, promotion and tenure, etc. involve deep philosophical questions, which are difficult to agree on and time-consuming to explore. Since administration claims that the crisis we face is fiscal, why are we spending time discussing non-fiscal issues? We have proposed that the parties focus exclusively on financial matters. They have rejected this proposal.
- Refusal to bargain beyond August 31. The administration has repeatedly said that it will refuse to bargain beyond August 31, 2017. This opens up the real possibility that they will walk away from the process. Such an action is an invitation for a crisis. It certainly is not the position of someone who wants to reach “a fair agreement in a timely manner.”
Both sides if they are truly committed to reaching an agreement through collective bargaining would pledge to either continue to talk and to make compromises as long as there were any hope of reaching a meeting of the minds, or they would agree to interest arbitration. - Refusal to agree to interest arbitration. We have repeatedly proposed that both parties agree to interest arbitration if they are unable to come to an agreement by August 31. We have suggested that we use a method of arbitration called last best offer. In this scenario, the arbitrator is constrained to support the last position of one of the parties (i.e. either the AAUP or the administration) after listening to both sides and taking evidence. Such a method has the advantage of putting pressure on both sides to make their offer fit the factual situation, since the position that is least reasonable will not be selected by the arbitrator. The administration has effectively rejected this proposal by saying they are not ready to agree to it. Interest arbitration works best when both sides work together to avoid having a third party settle the dispute. For that to happen, it must hang over the heads of the negotiators during the process. The administration has repeatedly argued that the concessions it has demanded are absolutely necessary and totally supported by the data. If this is true, then they not only should be more than happy to accept but also, indeed, should have been the party first proposing interest arbitration.
Your Negotiating Team,
Mike Brogan
Dave Dewberry
Herb Gishlick
Jeff Halpern
Joel Phillips
Elizabeth Scheiber
Arthur Taylor
